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SEARCH WARRANTS

national frontiers." 44 For states adopting the Arizona approach,
Schwartz and the Restatement can provide this flexible guidance in
resolving future choice-of-laws questions.
RALPH W.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

CHRISTY

SEARCH AND SEIZURE -

HEARSAY AS GROUNDS FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Presumably the United States Supreme Court acted with the
best intentions when it granted certiorari in the recent case of Spinelli v. United States1 for the purpose of further delineating the
quantity and quality of information which constitutes probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant 2 Ostensibly, in granting
certiorari to consider only the principal issue of search and seizure,
the Court limited itself to an exegesis of Aguilar v. Texas,' wherein
the ground rules for the affiant's use of hearsay information were
established. However, rather than explicating the rule of Aguilar,
the Court may have made a distinction without a difference, thereby
further beclouding the issue of probable cause at a time when the
high incidence of crime dictates that the police officer must be presented with clear and functional guidelines in the search and seizure
area. The decision, therefore, raises two related questions: Under
what circumstances can probable cause be established by an affiant's
use of hearsay information? And, does the Court's answer comport
with the realities of contemporary law enforcement?
William Spinelli had been under periodic surveillance by FBI
agents for almost two weeks prior to the issuance of a search warrant. The agents were acting on an informant's tip that petitioner
was engaged in gambling operations as well as their personal
knowledge of Spinelli's reputation as a gambler. Prior to the time
that the search warrant was sought, neither the informant nor the
agents personally observed gambling activity in Spinelli's apartment. The agents felt, however, that a warrant should issue on the
basis of their belief that petitioner had gambling equipment on the
premises, their knowledge of Spinelli's reputation as a gambler, and
a tip from a purportedly reliable informer. The warrant issued,
44 Cheatham, supra note 42, at 1230.
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Spinelli was arrested, and at trial his motion to suppress the warrant was denied. Subsequently, he was convicted under a federal
statute proscribing interstate travel with the intention of furthering
gambling operations, 4 and the court of appeals upheld the convic5
tion.
After granting certiorari on the limited search and seizure question, the Court delimited the critical issue to whether the magistrate
had probable cause for issuance of the warrant, 6 which in turn depended upon whether the agent's affidavit met the two-pronged
test enunciated previously by the Court in Aguilar v. Texas.7 In a
5 to 3 decision, the Court struck down the conviction on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause required for the issuance of a search warrant under the
fourth amendment.8
The standard that is to guide law enforcement officers seeking
1393 U.S. 410 (1969).
2
The basis for the requirement of probable cause is found in the fourth amendment, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Rather than writing an extended opinion, the Court might have chosen to dispose of
Spinelli by a simple per curiam opinion. This summary technique of per curiam
reversal had been employed by the Court just two months before in a similar case,
Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968), where, over a vigorous dissent by
Mr. Justice Black, the Court disposed of many complex issues in a relatively brief
opinion.
3378 U.S. 108 (1964). For a discussion of Aguilar, see note 17 & text accompanying notes 16-17 infra. In Spinelli the Court said: "Believing it desirable
that the principles of Aguilar should be further explicated, we granted certiorari,
our writ being later limited to the question of the constitutional validity of the
search and seizure." 393 U.S. at 412.
4 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Supp. III, 1968).
5382 F.2d 871 (8th Cit. 1967) (en banc). A majority of the court of appeals
held that the warrant was issued without probable cause, but later sustained the
warrant and upheld the conviction at a rehearing en banc.
6 391 U.S. 933 (1968).
In view of the multifarious issues dealt with by the
court of appeals, the review of the case on certiorari was restrained, to say the least.
Footnoted away by the majority were the issues of petitioner's standing to object to
the search (393 U.S. at 412 n.2), execution of the warrant, and description of the
property seized. Id. at 419 n.8. The Court did not consider the following issues:
(1) Denial of a preliminary hearing; (2) vagueness of the indictment, (3) constitutionality of the statute under which petitioner was indicted; (4) admissibility of some
post-arrest statements; (5) admissibility of gambling equipment; (6) propriety of the
lower court's instructions to the jury; and finally, (7) sufficiency of the evidence.
7 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). As the Spinelli opinion makes clear, Aguilar is the
controlling test today. The test itself is quoted in the text accompanying note 17 infra.
8See note 2 supra.
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the issuance of a search warrant has been formulated on a case-bycase basis.' The reason for this slow and difficult development is
that typically no predictable quantum of information is presented
to the magistrate. The facts in one situation that serve as grounds
for a finding of probable cause are not likely to reappear in similar
relation or degree in later cases. Although an examination of cases
with similar fact patterns reveals the existence of a general investigatory pattern composed of suspect identification, surveillance,
and apprehension, for two reasons no similar pattern is reflected in
the affidavits which relate the circumstances of each case. First,
each investigating officer assimilates, at best, only a random sample
of a suspect's totality of activity, and, second, this randomness is
further accentuated by variations in an individual officer's ability to
assemble and communicate these impressions. In the face of such
diversity, the Court has been unable to establish concrete rules to
9 See Pringle & Garfield, The Expanding Power of Police to Search and Seize: Effect
of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Criminal Investigation, 40 U. COLO. L.
REv. 491, 507-08 (1968), wherein the authors state:
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona painted with a broad brush,
laying down specific guidelines for police to follow in securing admissions
and confessions from suspects in custody. No such technique has been employed in the search and seizure cases. The Court's latest pronouncements
in this area show a continued adherence to the traditional formula of caseby-case determination ....
Other areas of the law of search and seizure which have experienced case-by-case
development include the following: (1) Search and Seizure and the Right of Privacy:
Within a certain zone of privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas would proscribe all intrusions. The perimeter of this zone has not been precisely delineated, but the concept does contemplate such places as the defendanes bedroom, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), and his private papers. Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886). Included in any analysis of the zone of privacy concept
must be Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), wherein, with Justice Douglas'
concurrance, the Court partially liberated the right of privacy from a case-by-case
analysis by holding that the fourth amendmenes protection against unreasonable
search and seizure is applicable to all enclosures where the citizen customarily enjoys
complete privacy. This recent development had its inception in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), where the Court referred to the fourth amendment as
creating a "right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people." (2) The Exclusionary Rule: Originally a rule
of evidence in federal courts, the exclusionary rule disallows, at trial, evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search- Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Three decades later the fourth amendment was held applicable to the
states, but the exclusionary rule was still considered a rule of evidence. Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court
held that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally sequired to make the fourth
amendment safeguards fully meaningful.
In his concise analysis of the Court's technique of case-by-case development,
Professor Ovid Lewis has said that continuing judicial development is the end product of a "concurrence of social forces [necessary] to constrain behavior." Lewis,
The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 528, 567 (1968).
Professor Lewis also enumerates analogous areas of case-by-case development outside
the purview of the fourth amendment. Id. at 530 n.10, 532 n.16.
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guide the magistrate in determining the existence of probable
0
cause.'
The main issue in probable cause cases involving hearsay has
been the amount of documentation required to justify the issuance
of a warrant. The first significant case was Nathanson v. United
States," in which the affidavit's supporting statement was completely devoid of substance. The defendant was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act' on the basis of a warrant issued pursuant to the officer's belief and suspicion that contraband
was on the defendant's premises. The Court held that mere belief
or suspicion was insufficient to support a showing of probable
cause.' 3 Less blatantly devoid of substance, but equally insufficient for probable cause was the warrant issued in Giordenello v.
United States.'4 In that case the defendant was convicted of the
unlawful purchase of narcotics. Though the warrant in question
was an arrest warrant and not a search warrant, the Court indicated
that the elements required for probable cause were the same.' " Because the affidavit failed to disclose an information source and was
couched merely in conclusory terms, the Court was easily disposed
to reverse the conviction.
With only the Court's two pronouncements to guide law enforcement officers and magistrates in their attempts to define the
quantum of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the Court's attempted formulation of a
10 Commenting on the gyrations caused by the flexible meaning of probable
cause, the National Crime Commission has noted:
[The predominant feature of search and seizure law is uncertainty. Note
but a few of the comments of the Justices themselves. Chief Justice Vinson
in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 669, 716 (1948), termed it a field
"replete with complexities." Justice Black in United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950), which but two years later overruled Trupiano,
observed in no "other field has the law's uncertainty been more dearly manifested." Justice Clark commented in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610, 622 (1961): "for some years now the field has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire." Justice Harlan, in Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963), commented on the lack of "predictability" of the
Court's decisions in the realm of search and seizure. The point is expressed
by Mr. Justice Cardozo: "Law as a guide to conduct is reduced to the level
of mere futility if it is unknown and unknowable." U.S. PRESIDENT'S
CoMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE:

TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 105 n.408 (1967).
11290 U.S. 41 (1933).
12 Volstead Act, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 307 (1919).
13 290 U.S. at 47.
14 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
15Id. at 485-86.
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broad guideline in the subsequent case of Aguilar v. Texas 16 was
long overdue. The affidavit in Aguilar contained a slightly different twist: Though the officer merely expressed a belief that narcotics were being kept on the premises, he did state that the source
of his information was a person whom he knew to be a reliable informer - but failed to document why he characterized the informant as reliable. The Court decided that this failure to support
the informant's reliability was dispositive, and laid down the following test: "[T]he magistsate must be informed of [11 some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant . . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' ,,f
It was the rather general language of this test which the Court
sought to refine by its pronouncements in Spinelli.
In reviewing the totality of the government's evidence against
Spinelli,' 8 the Court concluded that the validity of the informant's
16378 U.S. 108 (1964).

171d.at 114. Aguilar is important not only because it enunciated the present-day
test, but also because it dearly demonstrated that the principles announced previously
in federal cases are fully applicable to the states. The case came 3 years after Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the Court declared that the exclusionary rule,
previously a rule of evidence in the federal system, was constitutionally required by
the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence
seized in an illegal search is inadmissible at the trial of the accused. Aguilar came 1
year after Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), which announced that for purposes of
search and seizure, "the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 33. In the search and seizure area, the Court has
acknowledged that it is acting in a supervisory capacity over the federal system. Supervisory power is the Court's ability, sitting as a court of last resort in the federal system, to oversee the lower federal courts. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957). The principles of these federal cases are, however, fully applicable to the
states. In Spinelli, the Court implicitly acknowledged the binding effect of its decision
on the states when it granted certiorari specifically to explicate Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964), and also cited two other state cases for support, McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967), and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
IsThe following facts were presented by the government in partial corroboration
of the tip: (1) The periodic surveillance of petitioner's travel activities for 2 weeks
prior to the issuance of a search warrant; (2) the verification of two phone installations
and phone numbers in petitioner's apartment, and (3) knowledge of the general reputation of the petitioner.
It -was the government's position that the coalescence of these facts, taken together
with the tip from the informant, was enough to sustain a finding of probable cause,
even if no one of them alone was sufficient. Brief for Respondent at 7, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). The Court rejected this argument, holding that such facts were insufficient to
meet the minimum level for sustaining a finding of probable cause. The inference is
that Spinelli's travel activities and his two phones are facts of independent significance, having no necessary relation to gambling activity; and as for his reputation, it
should not be given any weight in determining whether there is probable cause.
Although the "totality of the circumstances" approach urged by the government
was approved by the decision of the court of appeals, 382 F.2d 871, 880 (8th Cir. 1967),
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tip was the dispositive factor in determining the existence of probable cause vel non. 9 The opinion presents a detailed description
of the evaluation process within which the Aguilar test was intended to function as a constitutional benchmark.2 ° In the Court's
view, after the magistrate has determined that the affiant's personal
observations alone are insufficient to establish probable cause, he is
constitutionally bound to evaluate any hearsay evidence in terms of
Aguilar's dual criteria, the facts that shaped the informant's conclusion, and the basis for the affiant's assertion of the informant's
credibility. The magistrate is charged with applying the above criteria within the context of two separate evaluations. First, he must
determine whether, standing alone, the tip can satisfy the Aguilar
test. Should the tip fail to do so, the magistrate must then undertake a second evaluation wherein he decides whether the nonhearsay portion of the affidavit corroborates the hearsay information to
such a degree that the tip is thereby elevated to a posture which
comports with Aguilar's requirements.
Because the Spinelli affidavit contained only a conclusory statement as to the informant's credibility, the Court passed by this aspect of the Aguilar test and confined its discussion to Aguilar's first
criterion, the basis for the informant's conclusions. The Court explained the function of this criterion within each of the two separate evaluations discussed above by drawing an analogy to those
cases dealing with warrantless searches conducted pursuant to information supplied by a police informant. 2' Although these cases
it was specifically rejected by the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. 393 U.S. at
415. It would seem, however, that if the concern is only with probability at the magistrate level, then all empirically based facts as a whole should be valid determinants in
a finding of probable cause. If one is trying to determine probabilities, there is no apparent value in judging related facts in isolation.
19 393 U.S. at 414.
20 The Court's attempt at formulating a rule of independent corroboration more
than likely was a response to an apparent indiscretion in the earlier case, Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), wherein the Court hinted that surveillance itself might be
enough to sustain probable cause:
It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing
court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention....
The fact that the police may have kept petitioner's house under surveillance
is thus completely irrelevant in this case, for, in applying for the warrant,
the police did not mention any surveillance ....
If the fact and results of
such a surveillance had been appropriately presented to the magistrate, this
would, of course, present an entirely different case. Id. at 109 n.l.
21 The informant is well entrenched as a component of American law enforcement
and is generally recognized to be necessary to insure the system's effectiveness. Within
limits, a testimonial privilege attaches to the government's knowledge of the informant's identity, so that the government ordinarily need not disclose the informant's
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require a greater showing of probable cause, 22 the Court used Draper v. United States23 and McCray v. Illinois24 to demonstrate that
identity when requested to do so by the defendant. See 8 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §
2374 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the informant derived his information about the defendant from actually participating in the narcotics transport for
which the defendant was later convicted, so that the informant could later be a material witness. The issue was whether the failure of the government to disclose the
identity of the informant constituted a violation of defendant's right to confrontation
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The Court established the rule that "where
the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination
of a cause, the privilege must give way." Id. at 60-61.
The continued application of the Court's statement is uncertain, however, in light
of its later pronouncement "that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable,"
Id. at 62, and its subsequent reading of Roviaro in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300
(1967). In McCray, besides reiterating the ad hoc approach with respect to disclosure
of the informant's identity, the Court said that Roviaro was decided under its supervisory power (see note 17 supra), and that the issue of disclosure in that case concerned
only the accused's innocence or guilt and not the matter of probable cause. 386 U.S.
at 309. It is, therefore, doubtful that the Court will expand the rationale of the rule in
Roviaro.
It can be persuasively argued, however, that in actual fact a search without a warrant is more likely to be upheld than a search with a warrant. As Professors Pringle
and Garfield have said, the determination of whether there is probable cause is made
on the basis of evidence presented to the magistrate before the search is made. At that
time, the police officer is required to show not only sufficient evidence to justify issuance of a warrant, but also those reasons which lead him to characterize his informant
as reliable. By contrast, where no warrant is issued, the informant's reliability is not
scrutinized until the hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence. At that time the
informant's tip must be weighed as to its reliability, after it has led to the production of
incriminating evidence which the defendant seeks to suppress. It is much more difficult to impugn the reasonableness of the officer's reliance after such reliance has turned
up the evidence. Pringle & Garfield, supra note 9, at 501.
22 In the informant cases, rather than allowing the incongruous result of requiring
a lesser showing of probable cause where the information is one step removed, the
Court has created a standard which both insures the existence and veracity of the informer and, at the same time, allows the informant to remain behind the scene, aiding
enforcement officers in subsequent investigations. While more facts are required to
sustain a finding of probable cause where no warrant is issued than where a warrant is
issued, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960), apart from this, there really
are no other "unique" rules in the informant area.
23 358 U.S. 307 (1959). On the basis of Draper,Justice White wrote an extended
concurring opinion in Spinelli. He argued that the majority had unfairly restricted
Draper to its facts by using it for a "suitable benchmark" to elaborate on the sufficiency
of detail necessary in describing the suspected criminal activity, as well as the amount
of support that a large number of details will provide for the informant's report. One
may not readily appreciate Justice White's distinction, but he believes that great detail
in the informant's report bears upon the informanes reliability, while according to Justice White, the majority holds that great detail is relevant to whether there is a substantial basis for believing criminal activity to be in progress. The upshot of Justice
White's statement is that if the Court's analogy to Draper has any significance, the information tendered by the informant in Spineli ought to increase the tip's reliability,
thereby justifying the issuance of a warrant. However, in a rather illogical conclusion,
Justice White declined to dissent because he did not wish to divide the Court. 393 U.S.
at 429.
24 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
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the processes of initial evaluation and corroboration were inherently the same in both the warrant and warrantless contexts.
In Draper, the defendant was convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting narcotics. In discussing Draper, the Court
emphasized that the informant supplied the officers with the particulars of Draper's physical appearance in such minute detail that
the ready inference to be drawn was that the informant had given
the officers reliable information which established probable cause
for Draper's arrest and incidental search. Ancillary to the holding
of Draper, which is necessarily limited by its own particular facts, is
McCray wherein the defendant was convicted for possession of narcotics after Chicago police officers had arrested him and seized
heroin from his person. The officers were acting on a tip from an
informant who told them that within the hour he had personally
observed the defendant selling narcotics and who also informed
the officers that defendant could be apprehended on a particular
street corner. That information, when added to the fact that the
informant had given reliable information at least 15 times previously, was sufficient to persuade the Court to uphold the lower
court's determination of probable cause for both the arrest and the
subsequent incidental search.
In each of the foregoing cases, the critical factor was the detail
with which the informant related information concerning the defendant to the attesting officers. The Court indicated that the informants' detailed accounts provided ample information in compliance with Aguilar's first criterion, "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant [made his conclusioni." In contrast, the Spinelli informant merely stated that the defendant had
two telephones and that they were used in gambling operations.
The Court concluded that this information could in no way be described as "detailed."
The same emphasis on detail was present in the Court's discussion of the second evaluation process, the matter of corroboration.
In both McCray and Draper, an examination of the tip and the officer's personal observations revealed many identical facts. In Spinelli, the only correlative information was the existence and numbers of the two telephones in the apartment where Spinelli was apprehended. Previously the Court has held that in a search without a warrant, the officer may rely on an informant's tip so long as
the tip is "reasonably corroborated" by other facts within the of-
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ficer's knowledge.2 5 But the Court has never decided that the hearsay tip of an informant must be corroborated by officers who seek
a search warrant, and, impliedly, such a strict rule seems to have
been rejected in Spinelli when the Court stated: "A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he
relies on an informer's tip that - even when partially corroborated
is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements
26
when standing alone."
Three conclusions can be drawn from the Court's statements on
corroborating testimony. First, the informer's tip is the critical factor that must undergo independent scrutiny. If the tip can stand
alone the inquiry need proceed no further. If the tip cannot so
stand, the second conclusion is that it will be redeemed if fully corroborated by independent observations of the police. Finally, short
of full corroboration, partial corroboration may save the tip only if
the corroborative facts are more profuse than those in Spinelli, and
more importantly, if those facts by themselves indicate a strong
probability that criminal activity is taking place.
It might be observed that thus far the Court has provided negative guidelines for law enforcement officers who seek search warrants. It is clear that mere suspicion, conclusory statements, and
failure to specify the underlying circumstances will not sustain a
finding of probable cause. But do these principles respond to the
core question of the quantity and type of information necessary for
a finding of probable cause? Or, do they lie in the penumbra of
the problem? The Court has delineated the process within which
the Aguilar test was intended to function, but it has not indicated
the quantum of either detail or corroboration which is the very
essence of that process - the factor whose absence leaves the process essentially undefined. Absent this critical information, it is uncertain whether police officers can use the Court's pronouncements
in a practicable way. In effect, the Court has delayed giving definite guidelines until it is required to do so.
Because Spinelli fails to grapple with this core issue, it perpetuates the confusion which surrounds the requirement of probable
cause. The consequence may well be to restrict the use of informants at a time when much attention is currently being focused on
the increased incidence of crime and on the heavy toll exacted from
25

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960).

353 U.S. 307 (1959).
26 393 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added).

See Draper v. United States,
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the average citizen by organized criminals 7 An examination of organized crime, which typically includes drug traffic, loan sharking,
gambling, and alcohol violations, indicates that gambling stands
out as the one crime presenting the greatest threat to domestic tranquillity and the effective administration of justice.28
In William Spinelli's case, the conviction was for a gambling
offense based on evidence seized by means of a search warrant, one
ground for the issuance of which was the reputation of the petitioner as a known gambler. If one accepts the judicially created
standard of Aguilar, there is no doubt that the hearsay in the affidavit neither justified the conclusion that petitioner was engaged in
criminal activity, nor did it provide a basis for believing the informant to be reliable. Similarly, there is no quarrel with the state27 Though there may be some basis for disputing the accuracy of the crime statistics
released yearly by the FBI, it is hard to dispute that they at least indicate an increase in
criminal activity. The latest statistics indicate that serious crime increased 17 percent
in 1968, while crimes of passion increased 19 percent. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1969, at
28, col. 3 (late city ed.).
Riding the crest of the public's increased attention was the report of the Presidential Crime Commission which states that the underworld's profit from gambling operations, which supplies one-third of the syndicate's gross revenue, is estimated to be $7
billion annually. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 189 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CRIME REPORT].
A national feeling of anxiety over the increased crime rate was soothed somewhat
by the legislative process in the form of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (Supp. 1969). Title I of the Act provides: "It is
therefore the declared policy of the Congress to . . . encourage research and development directed toward the improvement of law enforcement and the development of
new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals." Id. Cf. Vorenberg, The Presidential Crime Commission, 44
F.R.D. 76 (1968). Professor Vorenberg was Executive Director of the National Crime
Commission, and in his article he discusses the increased federal activity in this field.
28
See Lehman, Crime, The Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review
of the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MIcH. L REV. 1487, 1534 (1968),
wherein the author states:
[G]ambling is, as alcohol was forty years ago, the rock upon which organized crime is built. The [National Crime] Commission had before itindeed, it gives us-the salient facts. The take from gambling each year is
seven billion dollars. Second to gambling, the two most lucrative black market activities are loan sharking and the sale of narcotics, and the income
from gambling is twenty times that of either of the runners-up. Gambling
accounts for eighty per cent of all income from supplying illegal goods and
services. Perhaps more striking is the fact that if you add up all of the costs
of crime-including not only criminal income but the costs of the police and
the court system, of insurance and legal fees, of earnings lost by the victims
of violent crime, of private protection services-gambling accounts for a
third of the cost of crime in the United States. The income from gambling
each year is two and one-half times the total cost of running all of the nation's police forces.
See also KEFAUVER CoMm., 3D INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1951); J. MCCLELLAN, GAMBLING REPORT, S. REP. No. 1310, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 43 (1962).
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ment that the affiants' direct observation of petitioner's interstate
travels and his two telephone installations are facts of independent
significance and not necessarily related to criminal activity. However, the statement that Spinelli was "known" to the FBI and others
as a gambler bears a stronger relationship to criminal activity. The
Court characterized this information as a "simple assertion of police
suspicion," and, therefore, insufficient either as a basis for a magistrate's finding of probable cause or as a foundation for allegations
that would otherwise be nonprobative.2 9 In adopting such a position, the Court may have lost touch with reality and it might do
well to rethink its position.30
Unless one ignores the realities of organized crime, it would
seem appropriate to allow the reputation of one known to the community as a criminal to constitute some evidence in the magistrate's
determination of probable cause; that is, to introduce the common
knowledge of one's reputation as corroborative evidence in seeking
a search warrant."' The validity of this proposition stems from the
distinction between the presentation of facts for a showing of
probable cause at the magistrate's level and their presentation at
trial to establish one's innocence or guilt. At the former level, the
magistrate is far less constrained in determining facts bearing upon
a finding of probability than the jury is in determining what facts
are necessary for a finding of guilt. In an earlier opinion, Brinegar v.
United States," the Court made the following distinction: "In dealing with probable cause . .. as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act."33 While dearly reputa29

393 U.S. at 418-19.

30 One difficulty is that, though the Court's position on this point is dictum, the

basis offered for the statement is constitutional rather than evidentiary. Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933). Such being the case, the Court will probably
show great reluctance in changing its position.
3
1 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black suggests that a finding of probable cause
does not require one to isolate himself from the realities of life, and that one's reputation is a factual reality which may indicate a probability that gambling is taking place.
393 U.S. at 431 (dissenting opinion). See note 33 infra.
a2338 U.S. 160 (1948).
33 Id. at 175 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
108 (1965), wherein the Court stated: "[A]ffidavits for search warrants . .. must be
tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion .... Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common
law pleadings have no proper place in this area." In light of the above, Mr. Justice
Black's caution in Spinelli that one ought not to lose sight of the realities in law enforcement is especially salient.
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tion alone is not enough to constitute probable cause for the issuance of a warrant,8 4 it is submitted that the National Crime Commission's finding that an unmistakable relationship exists between
organized gambling and a select and well-known few who operate
the Nation's mammoth criminal syndicate3 5 should be considered
' in formulating a more pragby the Court as "legislative facts" 36
matic approach to the question of probable cause. Even if one concedes that Spinelli's travel activities and telephone installations are
innocuous in themselves and may have had no reasonable relation
to gambling activity, his reputation as a gambler should be viewed
as at least some indication of a probable connection to gambling
activity.
Since the fourth amendment contemplates a spectrum of searches
wherein an unreasonable search can only be defined in terms of degree, it appears that if the National Crime Commission Report is to
have the impact it deserves, greater emphasis should be placed on
encouraging local law enforcement agencies to loosen the stranglehold that organized crime now has on local government, businesses,
and citizens. This impact can be achieved only after the Court formulates more detailed and more realistic rules to guide law enforcement's contact man, the cop on the beat. Such specificity was
achieved when the Court delineated the fifth amendment's scope
in Miranda v. Arizona," and such precision must likewise be used
in explicating the requirements of the closely related fourth amendment. At a time when a stride was required, the pronouncements
34 The majority said that the reputation of Spinelli as a gambler could not of itself
establish probable cause. 393 U.S. at 418-19. The Court's reasoning no doubt is that
a man should not be held criminally culpable for his reputation, but only for his criminal activity. That this reasoning is naive in the face of present day realities is evidenced by the fact that 2 weeks after the date of decision by the Supreme Court a national news magazine published an expose on a criminal scheme in St. Louis which
contained not only a short description of Mr. Spinelli's most recent illegal employment, but carried a picture of him as well. LIFE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 52.
85
CRIME REPORT, supra note 27, at 191-96. The Commission has unequivocally
underscored the exclusive membership in organized crime:
Today the core of organized crime in the United States consists of 24 groups
operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation. Their membership is exclusively Italian, they are in frequent communication with each
other, and their smooth functioning is insured by a national body of overseers. To date, only the Federal Bureau of Investigation has been able to
document fully the national scope of these groups, and FBI intelligence indicates that the organization as a whole has changed its name from the Mafia
to La Cosa Nostra. Id. at 192.
36 For an excellent analysis of the Court's limited ability to properly evaluate
"legislative facts," the information which provides the impetus to judicial decision
making, see Lewis, supra note 9, at 556.
37 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See note 9 supra.

